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T here are two prevailing explanations of what caused China’s rate of economic growth to take off. The fi rst view gives the pride of place to globalization. According to this view, Chinese growth started when Deng 
Xiaoping liberalized trade and foreign investments by setting up special economic 
zones in the coastal provinces. In this view, China’s export-oriented manufacturing, 
largely foreign-funded, employed millions of rural migrants, boosted their income, 
and reduced poverty far and wide. The second perspective emphasizes the impor-
tance of internal reforms—especially in rural, interior regions—of the agricultural 
pricing system; land contracting; and the entry of rural businesses known as town-
ship and village enterprises.
China’s early external reforms are politically important. Special economic 
zones were ideologically controversial at the time they were introduced and their 
establishment signaled a triumph of the reformist leaders over conservatives. Also, 
the infl ows of foreign investments were not spontaneous; they required an explicit 
shift in policies and legal practices. Politically, the 1979 passage of the Law on 
Chinese–Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, only three years after the Cultural Revolu-
tion and committing the Chinese government to the protection of foreign property 
rights, was pathbreaking.
But the economic contributions of foreign investments do not remotely match 
those of China’s rural industry. At their peak, fi rms funded by foreign capital 
employed 18 million people (in 2010). By contrast, at their trough in 1978, town-
ship and village enterprises employed 28 million people. Between 1978 and 1988, 
How Did China Take Off ?
■ Yasheng Huang is Professor of International Management, Sloan School of Management, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts. His email address is 
yshuang@mit.edu.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.26.4.147. doi=10.1257/jep.26.4.147
Yasheng Huang
148     Journal of Economic Perspectives
China’s poverty headcount declined by 154 million, by far the most impressive 
record during China’s three decades of reforms. The contributions of foreign 
capital toward China’s initial poverty reduction during this period are miniscule. 
Employment by fi rms funded by foreign capital was 60,000 in 1985 and 660,000 in 
1990. The same two fi gures for township and village enterprises are 69.8 million 
and 92.7 million, respectively (National Bureau of Statistics 2011). China’s take-off 
in economic growth starting in the late 1970s and its poverty reduction for the 
next couple of decades was completely a function of its rural developments and its 
internal reforms in general.
During the golden era of rural industry in the 1980s, China had none of what 
are often thought of as the requisite features of the China growth model, like 
massive state-controlled infrastructural investments and mercantilism. In the 1980s, 
China had an overvalued exchange rate. Between 1980 and 1990, it had trade defi -
cits every year except 1982, 1983, and 1990. (By contrast, since 1989 China has had 
trade surpluses every year except 1993.) In the 1980s, the household consumption 
to GDP ratio stood at over 50 percent, compared with 35 percent in recent years.
To understand how China’s economy took off requires an accurate and detailed 
understanding of its rural development, especially rural industry spearheaded 
by the rise of township and village enterprises. Many China scholars believe that 
township and village enterprises have a distinct ownership structure—that they are 
owned and operated by local governments rather than by private entrepreneurs. 
That these fi rms could be so dynamic and effi cient, yet government-owned, is often 
treated as a paradox in the economics literature. This statist view of township and 
village enterprises, together with the widespread belief that Chinese government 
has retained tight control of fi nance, led many scholars to conclude that Chinese 
growth has defi ed the conventional wisdom on the importance of private entrepre-
neurship and fi nancial liberalization for growth.
But my own historical narrative—formulated on the basis of voluminous 
government and bank documents and data from the 1980s — directly contradicts 
this heterodox interpretation of Chinese reforms.1 I will show that township and 
village enterprises from the inception have been private and that China undertook 
signifi cant and meaningful fi nancial liberalization at the very start of reforms. 
Rural private entrepreneurship and fi nancial reforms correlate strongly with some 
of China’s best-known achievements—poverty reduction, fast GDP growth driven 
by personal consumption (rather than by corporate investments and government 
spending), and an initial decline of income inequality.
The conventional view of China scholars is right about one point—that today’s 
Chinese fi nancial sector is completely state-controlled. How does one reconcile my 
reading of the historical evidence on fi nancial reforms with the well-established 
1 The documents include a 22-volume compilation of documents of the central bank, all major state-
owned commercial banks, and the rural credit cooperatives between 1982 and 2004. While they are 
available at libraries at Chinese University in Hong Kong and Harvard, they have not previously been 
examined by researchers. (Of these, the specifi c documents I cite are in the reference list.)
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current fact of the statist fi nancial controls? The same documentary and data 
sources provide the answer: China reversed almost all of its fi nancial liberalization 
sometime around the early to mid 1990s. This fi nancial reversal, despite its monu-
mental effect on the welfare of hundreds of millions of rural Chinese, is almost 
completely unknown in the West.
My discussion is heavily tilted toward rural China because this is where Chinese 
growth took off. Developments in rural China also affected China’s overall transi-
tion to a market economy, not only because in the 1980s the vast majority of the 
population was rural but also because Chinese capitalism is rural in origin. Reforms 
in rural China determine the pace and the nature of China’s overall transition to 
a market economy. In the 1980s, it was the rural entrepreneurs who responded 
quickly to the incipient political and policy fl exibility and who started businesses 
that competed directly with the urban state-owned enterprises. By the same token, 
reversing rural reforms not only suppressed rural entrepreneurship but also had the 
effect of slowing down China’s overall transition to a market economy. In the 1990s 
and 2000s, China had no shortage of urban reforms, such as opening to foreign 
trade and investments; privatization of loss-making small state fi rms; and housing 
reforms. Yet China remains one of the most statist economies in the world. This is 
because the government reversed rural reforms in the 1990s.
The fi rst section of this paper provides an account of how both the initial condi-
tions and the specifi c reforms led to the rapid emergence of a market economy in 
rural China. The second section discusses an important institution in rural China—the 
township and village enterprises. A careful reading of original government documents 
suggests that contrary to the widespread belief, township and village enterprises may 
be history’s most successful private sector story. The third section discusses fi nancial 
liberalization and the subsequent reversals. The fourth section offers some specula-
tive comments about how the policy reversals may have affected Chinese growth and 
the composition of growth.
“Nothing Other than Revolutionary Reforms”
China’s rural reforms started in 1978, and their success was huge and instan-
taneous. Rural per capita income more than doubled between 1978 and 1984, and 
real rural per capita consumption increased by 51 percent between 1978 and 1983. 
Rural poverty declined sharply within the fi rst decade of reforms (Riskin 1987).
The success of rural reforms is striking, considering that many economists 
thought that China’s rural reforms were mere “modest” departures from the status 
quo (Lau, Qian, and Roland 2000). China did not dismantle all planned prices, 
but moved to a dual-track system in which farmers sold their crops at the market 
prices after they fulfi lled their obligations to the state at state-fi xed prices. Land 
was not privatized; it was contracted out to farmers on long-term leases. State fi rms 
were not privatized, but entrepreneurs were allowed to start their own businesses. 
Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004) emphasize the virtues of relaxing existing 
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restrictions compared with institutional reforms. Deng Xiaoping’s agricultural 
reforms, which they characterized as “humble” in origin, are a prominent example 
in their framework—evolution, not revolution, in other words.
Deng himself seemed to disagree. In 1984, Deng stated (as quoted in Rural 
Economy Research Team 1998), “The rural reforms that were carried out in the 
past few years are nothing other than revolutionary reforms.” Which perspective is 
correct? It depends on what benchmark you use. Western economists benchmark 
China to what is sometimes called a “Washington consensus” template that includes 
privatization, deregulation, fi nancial liberalization, rule of law, and democratiza-
tion. By that standard, Chinese rural reforms were modest. But the benchmark 
Deng had in mind was the Cultural Revolution, when the life of Chinese private 
entrepreneurs was, to quote Hobbes, “nasty, brutish, and short.” From this dynamic 
perspective, allowing partial market pricing of agricultural crops, land contracting, 
and millions of startups by rural entrepreneurs was not modest at all.
The rural reforms did not happen in isolation. They were implemented in 
conjunction with some broad changes in Chinese politics. The Chinese leadership 
took deliberate and well-publicized gestures to instill confi dence in policy cred-
ibility and political stability. In 1979, the Chinese government returned confi scated 
assets—bank deposits, bonds, gold, and private homes—to former capitalists and 
landlords. A large number of people imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution 
for engaging in private commerce were released from jail. (One survey showed 
that some 10 percent of China’s private entrepreneurs were former prisoners.) 
In 1980, two vice premiers personally brought New Year’s greetings to a woman 
who received the fi rst license to open a business in Beijing. In 1981, the Politburo 
passed a resolution that made private entrepreneurs—code-named “individual 
laborers”—eligible for Party membership. In 1984, Wenzhou—a backwater rural 
county then—released eight peasants-turned-entrepreneurs (arrested in 1982 for 
graft) and made restitution of their assets. It also published an open apology in local 
newspapers. In the 1980s, China also introduced village elections (in Huang 2008, 
I provide more details).
Economists typically think of constraints on government as a source of cred-
ibility. The effect of a marginal change—moving from the capricious Cultural 
Revolution to the more predictable era of Deng Xiaoping—is therefore under-
estimated. This directional change from complete opposition to private business 
during the Cultural Revolution to a supportive stance during the Deng era helps 
resolve a paradox: Why millions of entrepreneurs were willing to invest even though 
the power of the state was, and still is, absolute. One reason is that in the 1980s 
entrepreneurs no longer faced automatic risks of being arrested and executed. In 
the 1980s, China went a long way in establishing security of proprietors even though 
security of property was far from being achieved. One should never underestimate 
the incentive effect of not being executed! (By the same token, as the Cultural 
Revolution fades in memory and the safety of proprietor is taken for granted, the 
safety of property and the rule of law will increase in their importance for China’s 
future growth.)
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Policy and political stability also mattered for the workings of the dual-track 
price system. Economists praise the dual-track price system because its mechanics 
are straightforward, but they ignore a precondition for the system to work: peasants 
had to be confi dent that the planned targets would not be ratcheted up later. The 
dual-track price system was neither novel nor Chinese. The Soviet Union tried it 
many times but failed. The difference is the Chinese leadership committed itself 
to not ratcheting up the targets and did so credibly. It was the politics of the Deng 
Xiaoping era, not just the mechanics of the reform, that accounted for the success. 
There is another difference with the Soviet Union. Chinese reforms started in 
the rural areas and China was far more agrarian than the Soviet Union when that 
country began its own reform program. Rural China has always been more predis-
posed toward entrepreneurship and capitalism than urban China. Today many of 
the best private manufacturing fi rms are not located in Beijing or Shanghai but 
originated in then-agrarian provinces such as Zhejiang, Hunan, Anhui, and Sichuan.
Rural China’s capitalist predispositions arise in part from the nature of agri-
culture, which is less conducive to planning than industry, and in part from history. 
The Cultural Revolution was primarily an urban political shock that cleansed urban 
China of any vestiges of capitalism, but there were still some free market activities in 
rural China. For the land contracting reforms to work, economic agents need to have 
some knowledge of residual claims. That knowledge was still extant in rural China 
but absent in the urban area. The rural readiness for capitalism acted as a multiplier 
that amplifi ed the effects of policy reforms. This is why many of the reforms that 
elicited a huge supply response in China and Vietnam completely failed in the more 
industrialized Soviet Union (and for that matter, in urban China). Contexts and 
initial conditions provide the necessary complements to policy.
Private Entrepreneurship in Rural China
China’s economy took off not just because peasants became more productive 
in producing grain, but also because reforms created conditions for Chinese peas-
ants to switch to higher value-added activities such as industrial production and 
service provision. According to one study, four-fi fths of the income gains came from 
improving allocative effi ciency (Riskin 1987).
Township and village enterprises played a vital role in this process. They raised 
rural income, absorbed rural surplus labor, and contributed to a decline in the rural–
urban income gap in the 1980s. The value-added produced by these rural businesses 
increased from 6 percent of GDP in 1978 to 26 percent of GDP in 1996 (Naughton 
2007, p. 274). They also injected competition into the Chinese economy. In the 
1980s, these rural businesses were the only source of competition to the incumbent 
state-owned enterprises at a time when foreign fi rms were still restricted and urban 
private fi rms were small. They undermined the monopoly of state-owned enterprises 
in both product markets and factor markets (in labor and capital). They played “a 
catalytic role” in China’s economic transformation (Naughton 2007, p. 271).
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The conventional view on township and village enterprises—laid out in a text-
book on the Chinese economy—is that “township and village enterprises had a special 
distinction during this period [1978–1996] because of their unusual ownership and 
corporate governance setup. Originating under the rural communes, most township 
and village enterprises were collectively-owned. . . .” (Naughton 2007, p. 271). Collec-
tive ownership means ownership at the lower level of the Chinese political system, 
such as township and village. This special feature of township and village enterprises, 
according to Roland (2000), poses a challenge to researchers because, given their 
public ownership, they are not supposed to perform well. The strong theoretical 
priors of mainstream economists are that private ownership rights motivate entrepre-
neurs to invest and to take risks. The stellar performance of the township and village 
enterprises without this incentive device is puzzling.
Elaborate theories—some backed up by formal mathematical proofs—have 
been proposed to explain the performance of township and village enterprises 
as public-sector businesses. For example, Chang and Wang (1994) and Li (1996) 
argue that township and village enterprises had the advantage of political protec-
tion provided by the local governments and that in a biased fi nancial system they 
had preferential access to capital. Che and Qian (1998) and Roland (2000) develop 
models of township and village enterprises as an effi cient substitute for an economic 
environment with weak legal institutions. Stiglitz (2006) goes one step further. 
According to him, the biggest problem in transitional economies is not underde-
velopment of the private sector but stealing on the part of the private sector. The 
hybrid nature of township and village enterprises aligns the interests of the central 
government with those of the local governments and effectively prevents private 
stealing of public assets.
These theoretical conceptualizations are all predicated on one important 
empirical detail—that township and village enterprises are public. Is that claim true? 
Many Western scholars believe that township and village enterprises owed their 
origins to the rural “commune and brigade enterprises” created during the Great 
Leap Forward (1958 –1961) and thus should be viewed as collective institutions. This 
belief is only partially correct. In 1978, there were about 1.5 million commune and 
brigade enterprises, but by 1985 there were already 12 million businesses labeled 
as township and village enterprises (Ministry of Agriculture 2003). Clearly, the vast 
majority of township and village enterprises had nothing to do with the Great Leap 
Forward. They were, instead, a product of the rural reforms that began in 1978.
In the records that I studied, the term “township and village enterprise” fi rst 
appeared in a policy document issued by the State Council —the Chinese cabinet—
on March 1, 1984. This landmark document broke new policy grounds. It offi cially 
replaced the previous term “commune and brigade enterprise” with “township and 
village enterprises” precisely because, as the document pointed out, the old term 
was no longer an accurate description of many of the new enterprises spawned by 
rural reforms. The second paragraph of this historic document gave the following 
defi nition of township and village enterprises (Ministry of Agriculture 1985, p. 450): 
“Township and village enterprises include enterprises sponsored by townships and 
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villages, the alliance enterprises formed by peasants, other alliance enterprises and 
individual businesses.”
The enterprises sponsored by townships and villages are collectively owned—
the kind of fi rms Western economists assume to represent the universe of all 
township and village enterprises. The other two categories under the label of “town-
ship and village enterprises” are straightforward private businesses or entities. The 
private township and village enterprises are divided by size. Individual businesses are 
equivalent to single proprietorships in the West and they typically have an employ-
ment of seven people or under. The alliance enterprises (in Chinese, lianying) are a 
1980s reference to larger private-sector enterprises. They have multiple founders/
shareholders (who are usually unrelated by family ties). They employ more than 
seven people. Over time, references to alliance enterprises were replaced by the 
term “private-run enterprises” (siying qiye) after a major 1987 Politburo document 
began to explicitly use the term “private-sector fi rms” (China Township and Village 
Enterprise Yearbook 1989a, p. 138).
This defi nition of township and village enterprises as including private owner-
ship is consistently applied across the offi cial documents. Here are four excerpts 
from a sampling of offi cial statements, policy documents, and references. First, 
a manual prepared by the Shanxi Township and Village Enterprise Management 
Bureau (1985, p. 1) says that a township and village enterprise “belongs to collec-
tive ownership or individual ownership.” Second, a 1989 Ministry of Agriculture 
report to the State Council on the state of township and village enterprise develop-
ment summarized: “Nowadays a large portion of township and village enterprises 
comprise individual businesses and alliance enterprises. . . . Currently, individual 
businesses and alliance enterprises account for a large share of the township and 
village enterprises in the northwest, southwest, and other economically backward 
regions” (China Township and Village Enterprise Yearbook 1990, p. 4). Third, a 1987 
document by Agricultural Bank of China instructed its regional branches not only 
to lend to enterprises at the township and village level but also to lend to alliance 
enterprises and household businesses (China Township and Village Enterprise Year-
book 1989b, p. 524). Fourth, an analysis in the China Township and Village Enterprise 
Yearbook (1978–1987) states: “Compared with a state-owned enterprise, a township 
and village enterprise…is a collective-ownership or individual-ownership enterprise 
with a lot of autonomy and able to make decisions concerning its own fate” (China 
Township and Village Enterprise Yearbook 1989b, p. 3).
The critical distinction between the Chinese offi cial defi nition of township and 
village enterprises and the defi nition widely accepted in the Western economics 
literature is that the Chinese defi nition refers to geography —enterprises located in 
townships and villages regardless of their ownership. Western economists, mistak-
enly, assumed that the defi nition referred to enterprises owned by townships and 
villages.2 Interestingly, some Chinese bureaucrats have committed the same mistake. 
2 One early study published in English that got this question right is by Bryd and Lin (1990), a joint 
research project by the World Bank and Chinese academics. It identifi ed township and village enterprises 
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Wan Li, a foremost reformer and the vice premier in charge of agriculture in the 
1980s, remarked in 1984, “[Some offi cials] only include the original collectively 
owned enterprises of townships and villages started by the masses as township and 
village enterprises, but do not include those businesses later established by peasants 
on their own or those alliance enterprises fi nanced from pooled capital as township 
and village enterprises” in the defi nition of township and village enterprises (as 
quoted in China Township and Village Enterprise Yearbook 1991 p. 128).
The absolute majority of township and village enterprises, from the very 
beginning, were in fact private rather than public. In 1985, according to Ministry 
of Agriculture data, there were over 12 million township and village enterprises, of 
which 10.5 million were private. By contrast, there were only 1.57 million collective 
township and village enterprises in the same year. In 1978, the number of legally 
registered private township and village enterprises was zero; by 1985, this number 
had grown to 10 million strong. China’s township and village enterprises are prob-
ably one of history’s most remarkable private sector success stories.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the development of township and 
village enterprises over time based on Ministry of Agriculture data. (The Ministry 
of Agriculture data are more detailed than those provided by the National Bureau 
of Statistics because they are broken down by more detailed ownership categories. 
The two sources are consistent with each other.) In 1985, this data began to divide 
township and village enterprises into three categories: 1) collective, 2) privately-run, 
and 3) household businesses. The latter two categories are private, but differ in the 
size of their employment.
The growth of township and village enterprises occurred almost entirely on 
the private spectrum of township and village enterprises. The number of collective 
township and village enterprises was highest in 1986 and 1993, but then declined 
substantially throughout the rest of the 1990s. Meanwhile, the number of household 
businesses rose sharply throughout the 1980s as did the number of privately-run 
enterprises in the 1990s.
It is almost certain that these offi cial fi gures of collective fi rms overstate the size 
of the public ownership of township and village enterprises, especially for the 1980s. 
The reason is that in the 1980s the Chinese government supported private sector 
development through political statements and fi nancial opening, but it had not 
developed a legal framework for private entrepreneurs to register their businesses 
as explicitly private. Many private entrepreneurs therefore registered their busi-
nesses under the collective township and village enterprises. (One of the most 
famous examples of these “red-hat fi rms” is Wanxiang, which was founded by Lu 
Guanqiao. Wanxiang is now China’s leading automobile component supplier, and 
it has an operation in Illinois.) This changed in 1994 when China’s Company Law 
went into effect. Newly established private fi rms began to be explicitly registered as 
private and those previously registered as collective were converted into privately 
as covering both public and private sectors. But this study had no apparent effect on the modeling work 
of economists that treated township and village enterprises as run by local government.
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registered entities. This change appears in Figures 1 and 2. After 1994, there was 
a sharp increase in the number and employment of privately-run township and 
village enterprises and a corresponding decrease in collective township and village 
enterprises. Some scholars mistook this development as privatization of collective 
township and village enterprises. In reality, it was a clarifi cation of titles.
As shown in Figure 2, collective township and village enterprises were larger 
in terms of employment in the mid 1980s. In 1985, the collective enterprises 
accounted for 59 percent of overall employment in township and village enter-
prises. Keep in mind that the collective enterprises were founded in the late 
1950s and had had 30 years of operation whereas the private township and village 
enterprises were new entrants in the 1980s. Even with their late start, by 1989, the 
share of employment by private township and village enterprises matched that of 
collective township and village enterprises, and the employment share of collective 
township and village enterprises declined throughout the reform era (except for a 
brief interval between 1992 and 1994). Other measures show the same dynamism 
among private township and village enterprises. In 1989, private township and 
village enterprises claimed 58 percent of the after-tax profi ts and 45 percent of the 
total wage bill of all township and village enterprises. In short, the growth miracle 
Figure 1
Number of Township and Village Enterprises by Three Ownership Categories: 
Collective, Private-run, and Household Businesses, 1985–2002
(millions of units)
Notes: Data are from Ministry of Agriculture (2003).
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of the township and village enterprises took place almost entirely in the private 
sector, not in the collective sector.
Data on output tells a similar story about the importance of private township 
and village enterprises. In 1987, private township and village enterprises produced 
32 percent of the gross output value of the township and village enterprise sector.3 
However, this aggregate measure misses an important detail that has substantial 
policy implications—that private township and village enterprises prospered 
in poor provinces whereas collective ones tended to prevail in richer and less-
industrialized provinces.
Figures 3 and 4 divide China’s 29 provinces into three groups based on their 
per capita GDP and rural shares of population, respectively (with the middle group 
comprising nine provinces). The graphs are based on data for 1987. In Figure 1, the 
ten provinces in the top tier of per capita GDP—averaging 1,473 yuan per person—
have the lowest private share of the gross output value of the township and village 
enterprises compared with the provinces in the lower income tiers. (Gross output 
value includes both industry and service sectors.) On average for the provinces in 
3 The unweighted average of the private township and village enterprises’ share of the value of gross 
output across the provinces of China in 1987 is 40 percent.
Figure 2
Employment Shares of Township and Village Enterprises by Ownership 
Categories: Collective, Private-run, and Household Businesses, 1987–2002
Notes: Data are from Ministry of Agriculture (2003).
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the top income tier, private township and village enterprises produced 31 percent 
of the gross output value for the entire sector, compared with 47 and 48 percent for 
the other two income tiers.
The highest private share of township and village enterprise output is found in 
the province of Hebei, at 70.4 percent. In 1987, 85 percent of Hebei’s population was 
rural. By contrast, Shanghai had the lowest private share of the township and village 
enterprise output, only 6 percent, meaning there is an extraordinary range between 
provinces in private shares of township and village enterprise output. The three regions 
with the lowest private shares of the township and village enterprise output are all 
cities: Shanghai (6 percent), Beijing (10.9 percent), and Tianjin (12.2 percent).4 The 
contrast between Hebei on the one hand and Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin on the 
other illustrates the two sides in the development of Chinese capitalism: capitalism 
is rural and socialism is urban. Figure 4 further illustrates this divide. The ten prov-
inces with the highest share of rural population (86.5 percent) averaged 49 percent 
in private share of total township and village enterprise output. For the ten provinces 
4 Chinese cities are an administrative concept, not an economic one. Cities also have rural population 
under their administration. In 1987, 34 percent of Shanghai’s population was rural.
Figure 3
Private Shares of the Gross Output Value of Township and Village Enterprises for 
Three Groups of Provinces Based on their per Capita GDP, 1987
(provincial averages)
Notes: Data are from Ministry of Agriculture (2003). Twenty-nine provinces are divided into three groups 
based on their per capita GDP. The middle group has nine provinces. The fi gures in parentheses on the 
horizontal axis refer to the average per capita GDP in that income group. 
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with the lowest share of rural population (57.2 percent), the fi gure is 34.6 percent. 
There are other factors infl uencing private shares of township and village enterprise 
output, and the correlations are not perfect but fairly substantial. Across 29 provinces, 
the two-way correlation between per capita GDP and private shares of township and 
village enterprise output is about – 0.71; for rural population shares it is 0.49.
One of the undisputed achievements of Chinese reforms is a sharp reduc-
tion of poverty. In China, as in all developing countries, poverty is concentrated 
in underdeveloped rural regions. For this reason, it is important to focus on the 
economic and business developments in the poor provinces in order to understand 
how China reduced its poverty. In the poor provinces, it was private entrepreneur-
ship, not government-run township and village enterprises, that contributed to the 
bulk of output production. In aggregate, the scale of population affected by private 
township and village enterprises was massive.
As of 1987, private township and village enterprises already contributed about 
half of the output of the township and village enterprise sector in eight provinces, 
home to 260 million rural Chinese (30 percent of China’s rural population). In 
another 15 provinces, the rural private sector produced between 30 to 50 percent 
Figure 4
Private Shares of the Gross Output Value of Township and Village Enterprise for 
Three Groups of Provinces based on their Rural Shares of Population, 1987
(provincial averages)
Notes: Data are from Ministry of Agriculture (2003). Twenty-nine provinces are divided into three groups 
based on their shares of rural population. The middle group has nine provinces.
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of the township and village enterprise output value. These 15 provinces accounted 
for an additional 427.8 million rural Chinese (about 50 percent of the rural popula-
tion). Within a single decade of reforms, private township and village enterprises 
went from essentially nonexistent to contributing a substantial share of nonagricul-
tural output in provinces with close to 80 percent of the rural Chinese population. 
It would not be an overstatement to say that rural private entrepreneurship played 
an instrumental role in China’s impressive record of poverty reduction.
Financial Reforms and Reversals
An infl uential fi nance paper sought to explain why China can grow without 
fi nancial liberalization by identifying informal fi nance as a key source of capital 
for private entrepreneurs (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005). Informal fi nance and 
formal fi nance are, according to this view, substitutes. To evaluate this claim 
requires some contextual knowledge. Unlike other developing countries, China 
and other centrally planned economies categorically banned underground fi nance. 
Unlicensed deposit-taking or loan-making could be considered a capital crime. Thus, 
in China, that informal fi nance is allowed to operate at all is, ipso facto, evidence of 
fi nancial liberalization rather than evidence of fi nancial controls. It is unsurprising 
that informal fi nance is most vibrant during the most liberal period of Chinese 
reforms (such as in the 1980s) rather than in the Maoist period of the 1970s, and 
it is most vibrant in those regions of China with liberal economic policies (such 
as Wenzhou or Zhejiang province). After all, informal fi nanciers are themselves 
private entrepreneurs. Formal fi nance and informal fi nance are substitutes only if 
government policies suppress or discriminate against the private sector. Otherwise 
they are complements.
Based on the data of the early 2000s, Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) are 
correct that the private sector lacked access to formal fi nance, but they are wrong 
in believing that this was a permanent feature of Chinese reforms. In fact, China 
implemented far-reaching fi nancial liberalization at the very start of rural reforms, a 
fact that is basically unknown outside of China despite its monumental signifi cance. 
The reason for this lack of knowledge is that in the early 1990s, China reversed 
these reforms. The view that China challenges the standard view of economics by 
growing without fi nancial liberalization is due to an observation bias: much of the 
economic research was done during the reversal period since the early 1990s rather 
than during the liberal period of the 1980s.
Rural fi nancial reforms in the 1980s had three main components: First, 
the authorities began to delegate control rights of an important rural fi nancial 
institution—the rural credit cooperatives—to its depositor-members, who, nomi-
nally, were the true shareholders. Second, entry of entrepreneurs into fi nancial 
intermediation was permitted, even encouraged. Third, as a cumulative result of 
these aforementioned reforms, access to credit for rural private entrepreneurs was 
eased considerably.
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In 1985, rural credit cooperatives accounted for 76.8 percent of all agricultural 
loans and 47.8 percent of all loans extended to township and village enterprises. 
They also intermediated and disbursed many of the loans originating from Agri-
cultural Bank of China (China Finance Association 1986, p. II–19). Rural credit 
cooperatives were fi rst established in 1951 as genuinely private fi nancial institu-
tions. Their members elected the offi cers and determined the lending priorities 
and criteria of their own branches. But in the 1960s and 1970s, as central planning 
took hold in China, a state bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and local govern-
ments took control of rural credit cooperatives.
Reform of rural credit cooperatives was one of the fi rst acts of the reformist 
leaders. And unlike the much better-known household responsibility reforms, 
which were initiated by a group of Chinese peasants on their own in Anhui prov-
ince, the fi nancial reforms were launched by the central government. As early as 
1980, the Politburo tasked a fi nance leadership group specifi cally to reform the 
rural credit cooperative system. The plan formulated by this group was to restore 
three founding principles of rural credit cooperatives. These are “organizational 
reliance on the members, managerial democracy, and operational fl exibility.”
This 1980 policy document, cited numerous times by later policy documents, 
is remarkable in several ways. First, it clarifi es an issue of timing. Financial reforms 
occurred at the very outset of China’s growth process as a deliberate political and 
policy decision. They were exogenous to — or at least concurrent with— China’s 
economic takeoff. This detail on the timing of fi nancial reforms directly contra-
dicts a common claim among economists who study China —that, to the extent that 
China has implemented institutional reforms, they are endogenous with growth. 
Second, only four years after the Cultural Revolution, this document directly and 
explicitly singled out “government control” as the most serious problem affl icting 
rural credit cooperatives. This framing of government control as a problem set the 
tone for the reforms of rural fi nance for the rest of the decade.
In 1983, Agricultural Bank of China shifted from micro controls of rural 
credit cooperatives to indirect macro management. Agricultural Bank of China 
imposed a reserve requirement equivalent to 30 percent of the rural credit coop-
erative’s deposit base and rural credit cooperatives could lend the rest on their 
own (Agricultural Bank of China [1983] 1985). By 1985, 80 percent of the rural 
credit cooperatives in the country had adopted reforms along this line (Agricul-
tural Bank of China [1985] 1986, p. 34). In 1988, Agricultural Bank of China 
began to implement governance reforms. Article 11 of the employment regula-
tions of rural credit cooperatives drafted by Agricultural Bank of China called 
for selection of rural credit cooperative branch managers through “democratic 
election” at shareholder meetings (Agricultural Bank of China 1988b, p. 200). To 
safeguard the function of these elections, the same document explicitly banned a 
widespread practice in Chinese bureaucracy—rotating the heads of departments 
across regions.
The authorities also liberalized entry. Informal fi nance emerged not because 
of porous bans but because of deliberate and proactive policy encouragements. 
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These two statements from the 1980s are quite telling. First, here is Chen Muhua 
(1987): “In addition to the capital provided by the state banks and rural credit coop-
eratives, there are now various kinds of businesses with deposit-taking and lending 
operations. Non-governmental capital mobilization and non-governmental rural 
cooperatives have emerged. The various methods of fi nancial mobilization have 
made a positive contribution to local economic development.” Second, here is Han 
Lei (1984, p. 51): “Rural areas need state-owned banks and credit cooperatives for 
fi nance but at the same time, under bank supervision, we need to allow the exis-
tence of private free lending and borrowing.”
These are not two liberal academic economists advocating reforms. Chen 
Muhua and Han Lei were, respectively, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China 
(PBoC)— China’s central bank— and the Chairman of Agricultural Bank of China, 
arguably the most important state-owned bank in China in the 1980s, given the 
pioneering rural reforms. Several bank documents from that era justifi ed informal 
fi nance on competitive grounds—that they competed with and therefore helped 
improve the state-owned banks. (The bank documents in the 1990s made the same 
factual observation on competition but drew exactly the opposite normative and 
policy implications.)
Western academics who did research in the 1990s record informal fi nance 
primarily in liberal and richer regions of the country, such as Wenzhou and Fujian 
(Tsai 2002). Bank documents in the 1980s record informal fi nance activities across 
many economically heterogeneous regions, such as Guizhou (China’s poorest prov-
ince), Guangxi (poor and populated by ethnic minorities), and Jilin (a conservative 
stronghold of state-owned enterprises). A 1987 report by the Jilin’s Branch of the 
People’s Bank of China (p. 151) shows that 69 percent of rural households had 
access to informal fi nance and 81 percent of informal loans were used to fi nance 
production. A better predictor of informal fi nance is not geography, but liberal 
policies. That informal fi nance was present in many parts of the country is evidence 
that policies were liberal nationwide.
The nongovernment fi nancial institutions that Governor Chen and Chairman 
Han referred to are the “rural cooperative foundations.” Rural cooperative founda-
tions were local savings and loan institutions similar to rural credit cooperatives 
except that their shareholders exercised real control rights. Although the People’s 
Bank of China never formally acknowledged rural cooperative foundations as a 
legitimate fi nancial institution, it tacitly permitted their operation. The Ministry 
of Agriculture provided the political cover by giving rural cooperative foundations 
a formal status. Rural cooperative foundations competed directly with rural credit 
cooperatives and Agricultural Bank of China on both deposit and lending busi-
nesses. The scale of the rural cooperative foundations was massive. As of 1990, the 
rural cooperative foundations operated in 38 percent of Chinese rural townships 
(Rural Work Leadership Team of Fujian Communist Party Committee 1997). In 
Wenzhou, by the end of the 1980s, rural cooperative foundations began to approach 
Agricultural Bank of China in both loan size and network reach (Wenzhou Financial 
History 1995, p. 152, 225).
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In the 1980s, rural households also had substantial access to formal credit 
in addition to the new availability of informal fi nance. Bank documents from the 
era consistently called for easing of credit access for private entrepreneurs. Fixed 
interest rates are a barrier to private access to capital because they lead to scarcity 
and credit rationing. Another barrier is requiring fi xed assets as collateral. In 1984, 
Agricultural Bank of China permitted fl oating interest rates and waived collateral 
requirements for household businesses, and then in 1988 extended the same poli-
cies to larger private-run enterprises (Agricultural Bank of China [1984] 1986, 
p. 364; Agricultural Bank of China 1988a).
On all three fronts—reforms of rural credit cooperatives, entry liberalization, 
and credit access, bank documents reveal evidence of explicit, direct, and complete 
policy reversals in the early 1990s. The 1988 ban on rotating rural credit cooperative 
managers was rescinded in 1992 (Agricultural Bank of China 1992b). Rotation is a 
mockery of democracy as it nullifi es any elections in the rotated regions. (Imagine 
rotating the governor of Massachusetts to Maine.) The control rights of rural credit 
cooperatives were recentralized. The three principles cited often in the 1980s docu-
ments —“organizational reliance on the members, managerial democracy, and 
operational fl exibility”— completely disappeared in the 1990s. The bank documents 
now emphasized the “cooperative” nature of rural credit cooperatives, which in the 
Chinese parlance means in a state of transition from private to public ownership. After 
1996, even the implied autonomy associated with “cooperative” was dropped. In 1999, 
Shi Jiliang (1999), a vice governor of the central bank defi ned rural credit cooperatives 
explicitly as “local government fi nancial institutions.” In March 1998, the People’s 
Bank of China ([1998] 1999) formally assumed operational controls of rural credit 
cooperatives, including personnel appointments, screening of candidates, account 
examinations, and the termination of appointments. The micromanagement of rural 
credit cooperatives, still nominally owned by their members, was numbingly detailed. 
A 1995 Agricultural Bank of China document instructed its offi cers to examine the 
fi ling systems and to inspect the computer software used in rural credit cooperatives 
(Agricultural Bank of China 1995). The management of rural credit cooperatives had 
completely returned to their status quo during the central planning era.
In the 1990s, the authorities mounted a ferocious attempt to wipe out informal 
fi nance. Several private fi nancial entrepreneurs were arrested and punished 
severely. One, an illiterate woman in Zhejiang, was executed. (She committed the 
alleged fraud in 1986 but was executed only when the macro policy changed, in 
1991. Incidentally, another Zhejiang woman, Wu Ying, was given a commuted death 
sentence in 2012 for “illegal capital mobilization.”)
The most direct target was rural cooperative foundations. In 1993, rural 
cooperative foundations were stripped of their deposit-taking businesses and were 
ordered to transfer their deposits to rural credit cooperatives (State Council [1993] 
1994, p. 7). The following year, the authorities restricted the lending operations of 
rural cooperative foundations to low-margin agricultural production and forbade 
establishment of new branches and lending to urban residents (Rural Work Leader-
ship Team of Fujian Communist Party Committee 1997).
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The offi cial language on competition changed from laudatory to derogatory. A 
1996 document described rural cooperative foundations as “competing viciously” with 
state-owned banks. Instead of welcoming the competition as Governor Chen Muhua 
did in 1986, this decree ordered a complete takeover of all rural cooperative founda-
tions by rural credit cooperatives, which, as pointed out before, were themselves being 
recentralized. Then in 1998, in a decree issued by the State Council and signed by 
none other than the premier himself, rural cooperative foundations and all forms 
of informal fi nance were categorically declared illegal. The decree criminalized not 
only the informal fi nance itself but also any failures by offi cials to refer the informal 
fi nancial operations to public security bureaus (State Council 1998).
The private sector’s access to formal fi nance was sharply curtailed. In the 
1980s, rural credit cooperatives and rural cooperative foundations were important 
sources of funding for nonfarm entrepreneurship in rural China. In the 1990s, 
rural cooperative foundations were abolished and rural credit cooperatives were 
ordered to redirect their lending focus to agriculture. High fl oors were set for 
agricultural lending in the total loan program of rural credit cooperatives (usually 
above 40 percent). This is an implicit discrimination against rural private entrepre-
neurs who started businesses to get out of agriculture. Another implicit discrimination 
was the order to direct lending to production rather than investment. In a 1996 
State Council document, fi xed-asset loans were capped at 30 percent of all rural 
credit cooperative loans. Private entrepreneurs, by defi nition, were new entrants 
and needed loans to fi nance construction of new facilities.
The lending criteria were tightened substantially for private borrowers (despite 
clear evidence that it was urban state-owned enterprises, not rural entrepreneurs, 
that defaulted on loans). In 1992, Agricultural Bank of China required rural credit 
cooperatives to collect deposits from private entrepreneurs for a “risk guarantee 
fund” as an eligibility criterion (Agricultural Bank of China 1992a). In the 1980s, 
rural credit cooperatives used fl oating and higher interest rates to mitigate against 
default risks. Both evidence and theory suggest that this approach can be produc-
tive because it is able to distinguish between good and bad borrowers. Potentially 
productive borrowers can generate returns to pay for the higher interest costs. The 
1992 policy required an upfront payment, and it biased lending to the incumbent 
businesses at the expense of new entrepreneurial entrants.
In the 1980s, the Agricultural Bank of China and rural credit cooperatives 
waived collateral requirements under certain conditions. In the 1990s, collateral 
requirements were reinstated and tightened. The most common form of assets 
in rural China—land for private farming and private housing structures—was 
purposely excluded as collateralizable assets. This raised the threshold for loan eligi-
bility substantially (see Rural Work Leadership Team 1997). Even all these measures 
were deemed inadequate. In 1994, Agricultural Bank of China required rural credit 
cooperatives to issue loans to private entrepreneurs only after two signatures were 
secured, one from the loan offi cer and the other from the head of the rural credit 
cooperative at the next higher level. For example, a loan in a township had to be 
approved at the county level (Agricultural Bank of China 1994).
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Along with these fi nancial controls, the governance of rural credit coopera-
tives deteriorated as rural credit cooperatives essentially became cashiers of local 
governments rather than serving the needs of their nominal shareholders. Here is 
a catalog of egregious lending practices compiled by the People’s Bank of China 
(2001): making loans to peasants in the form of goods rather than money and 
forcing peasants to sell the goods to buyers designated by rural credit cooperatives; 
expropriating the share capital contributions of the members of the rural credit 
cooperatives when extending loans; collecting taxes and fees from peasants when 
making loans; making loans to township and village governments to fi nance their 
tax bills to higher-level governments; forcing peasants to purchase shares of rural 
credit cooperatives and deducting their share contributions from their loans; 
fi nancing government offi ce construction and purchasing luxurious sedans while 
operating at a loss.
The health of rural fi nance deteriorated massively. The bank documents 
reveal that while rural credit cooperatives carried some nonperforming loans on 
their books in the 1980s, almost all of these nonperforming loans resulted from 
lending during the Cultural Revolution when rural credit cooperatives extended 
consumption loans to indigent households. Nonperforming loans increased in the 
1990s after fi nancial controls were instituted. In 1994, 31.4 percent of the loan 
assets of the rural credit cooperatives were nonperforming, and in 1996 nonper-
forming loans increased to 38 percent, according to Dai Xianglong (1997), the 
Governor of the People’s Bank of China. The shareholder equity of the rural credit 
cooperatives was reported to be 63.2 billion yuan in 1995, 54.8 billion yuan in 1996, 
31 billion yuan in 1997, 15.1 billion yuan in 1998, and –8.5 billion yuan in 1999 
(China Finance Association 1997, p. 452; 2000). Within a single decade of policy 
reversals, an institution that had played an important role in China’s economic 
takeoff became technically insolvent.
Conclusion
This concluding section addresses four issues. First, why did China reverse its 
rural fi nancial reforms? Second, is the claim that China initially opened and then 
subsequently closed its rural fi nance supported by quantitative as well as docu-
mentary evidence? Third, did the policy reversals in rural China matter for real 
economic outcomes? Fourth, did the policy reversals affect China’s pace of transi-
tion to a market economy?
The rural policy reversals coincided closely in timing with the assumption of 
power by a new group of leaders in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen crack-
down. In the 1980s, the leader in charge of the economy—Zhao Ziyang—pioneered 
rural reforms in Sichuan, but he fell from power in 1989. Between 1989 and 2002, 
China was led by a group of urban technocrats who made their political career in 
the most urban and statist region of China—Shanghai (Huang and Qian 2010). The 
urban technocrats launched massive infrastructure projects that required classic 
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mobilization of fi nancial resources. They reduced the credit allocation to rural 
China and stamped out informal fi nance—mostly in rural China—in order to fund 
these big-push projects. The instability of 1989 also prompted the leadership in the 
1990s to strengthen the controls by the Communist Party across the board and to 
discontinue the incipient political reforms introduced by Zhao Ziyang. Rural China 
bore the brunt of this reversal because political reforms went farthest in rural China.
There is quantitative—not just documentary—evidence for the fi nancial 
reform/reversal story as laid out in this paper. Examining a large rural household 
dataset conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture between 1986 and 2002, in Qian 
and Huang (2012), my coauthor and I found that credit access by rural house-
holds declined sharply between the 1980s and the 1990s. Specifi cally, during the 
1986 –1991 period, close to 30 percent of rural households reported receiving either 
formal or informal credit. This ratio declined to 10 percent between 1995 and 2002. 
We found that, controlling for a variety of household characteristics, the political 
status of households—such as having a Communist Party member—had no effect 
on credit access in the 1980s but a substantial and positive effect in the 1990s. As 
credit access was reduced, political power became more important in credit alloca-
tion. Another fi nding is that in the 1990s fewer loans went to households who ran 
nonfarm businesses as compared with the 1980s. The policy changes shown in the 
documentary examination had a real and substantial effect.
One can easily counter the claim that rural fi nancial policy reversals have inhib-
ited economic growth by pointing out that China’s GDP has continued to grow 
strongly since the early 1990s. But it seems the rural fi nancial policy reversals affect 
the composition of the growth rather than the growth itself. One clear difference 
between the 1980s and the 1990s lies in the growth rates of rural household income. 
Although there are data complications (mostly having to do with how rural migrant 
labor income is measured), the overall trend is clear. Between 1978 and 1988, 
growth of real rural household income per capita averaged more than 10 percent a 
year, exceeding the GDP growth. Between 1989 and 2002, the growth slowed down 
to 4 percent a year, less than half of the GDP growth. In fact for several years in the 
late 1990s, there was no nominal growth of rural household income at all. All 
the growth came from defl ation. (Since 2003, rural household income growth 
recovered to about 7 percent per year.)
It would be surprising if this slowdown in rural household income on the part 
of some 70 percent of the population did not affect China’s growth patterns. In 
the 1980s, household consumption to GDP ratio was around 50 percent. This ratio 
began to decline in the early 1990s, and now it is only around 35 percent, probably 
the lowest for any major economy. In the 1990s, Chinese growth became increasingly 
driven by the state-controlled investments and then since 2000 by net exports. This 
is in sharp contrast to the 1980s, when China was investing at a level comparable to 
other East Asian economies and its trade accounts consistently produced a defi cit. 
A reasonable hypothesis is that reduced growth of rural household income led to a 
slowdown of rural household consumption and this income effect is in addition to 
and possibly more important than the changes in household savings behavior.
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My account is heavily tilted toward developments in rural China. One may 
argue that this rural focus, while important to a story of how China initially took off, 
is less relevant to China today. Rapid industrialization has reduced the rural share 
of population from 80 percent in the 1980s to around 50 percent today. Also one 
may argue that the negative effects of rural policy reversals are more than offset by 
the urban reforms since the early 1990s, such as opening to foreign direct invest-
ments, privatization of urban state-owned enterprises, and restructuring of the 
banking system. On the basis of these reforms, some economists have pronounced 
that China has already succeeded in transitioning to a market economy and its 
major challenge today is economic development rather than reforms (Qian 1999; 
Naughton 2007).
My account does not support this optimistic assessment of Chinese reforms. 
A key insight here rests on some fundamental differences between rural and 
urban China. Chinese capitalism is rural in origin, and rural capitalism is highly 
entrepreneurial in a Schumpeterian sense. Urban China, by contrast, is far more 
state-controlled. The urban reforms since the early 1990s have led to the rise of a 
politically-connected, rent-seeking private sector (the most prominent example of 
which is the real estate private fi rms), whereas the reversals of rural reforms have 
been at the expense of a more arm’s-length, entrepreneurial type of private sector. 
The effects of rural policy reversals go beyond rural China; they may have slowed 
down the overall pace of market transition.
Those who argued that China has completed its market transition cite rising 
and high shares of private output as evidence. For example, an OECD study shows 
that private fi rms accounted for 52.3 percent of industrial value-added in 2003, up 
from 27.9 percent in 1998 and, most likely, from zero percent in 1978 (Dougherty 
and Herd 2005). Estimates like this tend to overstate the true size of China’s private 
sector. First, the defi nition of private sector is complex. The OECD study includes 
“legal-person” shareholding fi rms in its defi nition of private fi rms. In reality, many 
of these fi rms are affi liates or subsidiaries of state-owned enterprises and should 
be classifi ed as state-owned enterprises. A more realistic estimate is that the private 
share of industrial value added in 1998 was 18 percent in 1998 and 28 percent in 
2003 (Huang 2008).
The fact that the output share of the private sector has grown is not disputed. 
The issue is whether the size of private sector output is a reliable indicator of 
economic transition. Here an example from the Soviet Union is illustrative. No one 
accuses Leonid Brezhnev of being pro-market, but under his leadership, private 
plots contributed as much as half of agricultural household income in the Soviet 
Union (Gregory and Stuart 1981, p. 230).  This occurred because private farming 
was so much more effi cient than state farming, so its contribution to income was 
disproportionate to the inputs allocated to it. Private plots only accounted for 
1.4 percent of cultivable land in the Soviet Union (Hewett 1988, p. 117).
This Soviet example shows that input, not output, is a more reliable measure 
of private-sector policies. Output measures of transition confl ate two effects: an 
effi ciency effect and a policy effect. Because private fi rms are more effi cient, their 
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output share can rise even if the policy environment is fi xed or adverse. In 1990, 
the post-Tiananmen leadership cracked down on the private sector, and yet the 
output share of the private sector still increased. By one input-based measure, fi xed 
asset investments, China’s private sector development was not linear. Between 1981 
and 1989, the private share of fi xed asset investments averaged around 21 percent. 
Between 1993 and 2001, the share declined sharply to 13 percent (for details, see 
Huang 2008).
The rural policy reversals directly contributed to this development. In the 
1980s, almost all of the private fi xed asset investments were rural, and the net effect 
of rural policy reversals was to reduce the growth of the private sector from a much 
larger, initial rural base of capitalism. The private sector did grow, especially since 
2000, but that growth was off a far smaller urban base.
To understand the two sides of China’s growth story—its steep poverty reduc-
tion on account of fast personal income growth, and the statist orientation of its 
economy today—it is important to get the rural story right. China’s takeoff began 
with rural entrepreneurship and substantial liberalization, but for political reasons, 
its leadership in the 1990s chose to reverse or discontinue much of the reform 
package that proved so promising. Financial reforms were completely reversed and 
land contracting reforms did not deepen. One reform that survived—village elec-
tions—was weakened considerably by the fact that the Chinese Communist Party 
tightened its direct controls of villages. Only village directors are subject to elec-
tions; village Party secretaries, who have real power, are not.
Between 1978 and 2012, it has taken China more years to “reform” the central 
planning system than it took for it to establish and operate that system from 1949 
to 1978. Under a broad defi nition of private sector, China’s private fi xed-asset 
investment share was around 34 percent in 2005. This is less than the same ratio in 
India—of Indira Gandhi, not of Manmohan Singh, that is. In 1983, the comparable 
Indian ratio was 58 percent (World Bank 1989). China has moved from central-
planning to what might be called a commanding-heights economy. This is progress, 
but China is far from completing its transition to a market economy.
■ The author greatly benefi ted from discussions with and comments from Daron Acemoglu, 
David Autor, Chang-Tai Hseih, David Li, John List, Meijun Qian, Yingyi Qian, Heiwai 
Tang, Timothy Taylor, and Bernard Yeung.
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